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Abstract 
The bilateral real exchange rate between Chinese renminbi (RMB) and the US dollar is studied. The panel data Penn effect 
model shows that the RMB was overvalued in 1980–1991 but later undervalued in 1992–2010. In 2010, it was undervalued by 
36.7%. Econometric analysis and an examination of the appreciation of seventeen currencies belonging to countries and areas 
under the same economic development stage show that the RMB should appreciate at an annual speed of 3.2%. At this rate, the 
RMB misalignment in 2010 will be corrected by 2020. In the future, RMB appreciation should be realized totally from the 
nominal exchange rate, not partly from the nominal exchange rate and partly from the relative price level. This appreciation 
path satisfies the interests of both China and the US. 
JEL classification: F31; F41 
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1. Introduction 
After more than 30 years of robust economic growth at an annual GDP growth rate of 9.9% from 1978 to 2010, China has 
finally surpassed Japan in terms of GDP and Germany in terms of both exports and imports. China is now the second largest 
country both in economy and external trade volume. In 2010, China accounted for 9.4% of the world’s GDP, 9.3% of the 
world’s exports of goods and services, and 8.2% of the world imports of goods and services, next only to the US. With its rising 
global economic presence, China has accumulated a huge trade surplus, especially in its bilateral trade with the US. Meanwhile, 
the US has accumulated a huge trade deficit. From 1983 to 2010, China maintained an annual (goods) trade surplus with the US. 
The annual bilateral trade surplus increased from US$0.3 billion in 1983 to US$291.1 billion in 2010. In 2010, the US trade 
deficit with China amounted to 2% of its GDP (US$14586.7 billion).
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 Many experts, including Bergsten (2010), blame the 
undervalued renminbi (RMB) for the huge US trade deficit with China.  
Given the foregoing background, the RMB exchange rate, particularly its undervaluation and appreciation, has become 
controversial in recent years. Frankel (2005), using the Penn effect model and cross-section data, concluded that the RMB was 
undervalued by 36.1% in 2010 and proposed an annual real exchange rate appreciation of 4% for ten years or more toward an 
equilibrium value. Wang et al. (2007), using the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) model and the Johansen 
cointegration technique, concluded that RMB ﬂuctuates around its long-run equilibrium rate within a narrow band, suggesting 
that it has not been consistently undervalued. Zhang and Wan (2008), using the structural VAR model to analyze sources of 
China’s trade balance ﬂuctuations, concluded that although the RMB is undervalued, changes in the exchange rate has little 
effect on trade balance. By examining some economies that have experienced real currency appreciation against the US dollar 
in 1985–2005, Xu (2009) found that the mode of faster wage growth and inﬂation is as common as nominal appreciation, and 
asserted that the real appreciation of RMB will contribute to restructuring China’s economy toward a domestic demand-based 
growth track. Cheung et al. (2010) highlighted challenges in properly assessing the nature and degree of currency misalignment, 
and discussed the implications of sampling uncertainty on determining the extent of RMB misalignment. Cline and Williamson 
(2011), using the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) model, concluded that the RMB was undervalued by 10.6% in 
late October in 2011. Eichengreen (2011, p. 728) stressed that, in the process of RMB internationalization, exchange rate 
ﬂexibility must be enhanced, and this entails China abandoning the strategy of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate to 
stimulate the export of manufactures. 
In reality, responding to US pressure, China has been adjusting its exchange rate regime and appreciating the RMB since July 
2005. Before the reform in July 2005, the nominal exchange rate was 8.3 yuan per US dollar. Until February 2012, the rate had 
appreciated by 24.1% [(8.3-6.3)/8.3] or 31.7% [(8.3-6.3)/6.3], resulting in an exchange rate of less than 6.3 yuan per US dollar. 
However, the call for greater RMB appreciation has not been abated. For example, during his recent visit to China in January 
2012, US Treasury Secretary Geithner again stressed that China should continue to let its currency appreciate.
2
 The US expects 
RMB appreciation, which is too slow, to increase US exports and reduce the US trade deficit (Bergsten, 2010). Meanwhile, 
China seeks to continue promoting the RMB exchange rate mechanism’s reform at a gradualist approach; China maintains that 
the RMB exchange rate is not the basic reason behind the US trade deficit.
3
 As long as China is running a trade surplus with the 
US, the RMB will always be pressured to appreciate, and the dispute between the two biggest economies will not end. In China, 
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policymakers worry about the negative effects of RMB appreciation on export and employment, as simulated and proven by 
Frenkel and Ros (2006), Zhang and Fung (2006), and Thorbecke and Zhang (2009). In addition, policymakers do not have 
enough knowledge on how to appreciate RMB in the long run. 
This paper discusses the RMB real exchange rate’s undervaluation and appreciation to add new understanding to the field. 
We follow the ideas of Frankel (2005) and Xu (2009), who both discussed RMB undervaluation and appreciation, but we use a 
different empirical method. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 calculates how the RMB was undervalued in 1980–
2010 using the panel data Penn effect model. Section 3 discusses which speed of RMB appreciation is feasible in the context of 
international comparison and scenario forecasting. Section 4 discusses which path of RMB appreciation is desirable, through 
nominal exchange rate or through relative price level, from an international comparison and empirical analysis. The conclusion 
is given in Section 5. 
2. How is RMB undervalued? 
Among many models used in calculating RMB misalignment, the most appropriate one for the purposes of this study is the 
Penn effect model because this model can be used not only to assess how RMB is undervalued (in this section) but also to 
analyze the speed and path of RMB appreciation (Sections 3 and 4). The Penn effect model has been used broadly in RMB 
valuation studies (e.g., Takeuchi, 2003; Chang and Shao, 2004; Frankel, 2005; Xu, 2009; Cheung et al. 2007, 2010). In this 
study, we follow Cheung et al. (2010, p. 274–275) and use the term “Penn effect model.” 
2.1. Model and data 
The Penn effect model is based on absolute purchasing power parity (PPP), the most basic and influential model for 
assessing bilateral nominal exchange rates (NER). The PPP model uses Eq. (1), where RER is real exchange rate, P is a 
country’s domestic price level, P
*
 is the specified foreign country’s price level (in this paper, US price level), and NER is the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate expressed as the national currency unit per US dollar. Given this definition, a greater RER value 
implies its appreciation, whereas a smaller NER value implies its appreciation. In the PPP model, whether NER equals its PPP 
rate is decided by the value of RER. If RER is equal to 1, NER is equal to its PPP rate and is at equilibrium; otherwise, it is 
over- or undervalued. Given this definition, RER also refers to a country’s price level (relative to the US), as used in the Penn 
World Table (PWT) database. 
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 (1) 
The RERs (in this definition) in rich countries are higher and those in poor countries are smaller, making deviation from the 
PPP common. This empirical regularity was documented in a series of studies by economists in the University of Pennsylvania, 
hence the term “Penn effect” (Isard, 2007, p. 10; Cheung et al., 2010, p. 274–275). Based on the Penn effect, the Penn effect 
model uses Eq. (2) or its linear form to value a currency’s RER. In Eq. (2), RER is defined by Eq. (1), GDPP is GDP per capita 
representing income level or economic development stage, and subscripts i and t denote panel data dimensions. Eq. (2) 
regresses the RERs of countries on their income levels, so deviations from the regression line represent the over- or 
undervaluation of RERs when the Penn effect is taken into account. 
tititi uGDPPbbRER ,,10, )log()log( ++=                                                                                                                                       (2) 
In this section, all data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) online database. The RER labeled 
“PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate ratio” in the database and GDPP (in current US dollar, relative to the US) can 
be directly obtained. We first sequence all the available countries and areas by their GDP (in current US dollar) and choose the 
biggest 20 countries and areas. Euro countries adopted inconsistent currencies before and after 1999, so we delete Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, and Belgium. In the end, the other 14 biggest countries are used: United States, China, Japan, 
United Kingdom, Brazil, India, Canada, Russia, Mexico, Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Switzerland, and Poland. The sample period 
is 1980–2010 because RER data before 1980 cannot be obtained. 
2.2. Panel estimation and RMB misalignment 
Table 1 gives results of the redundant fixed effect test. The associated p-values of the statistics strongly reject the null 
hypothesis that the cross-section effects, period effects, or both of the effects are redundant. The two-way fixed effects 
estimation is appropriate and is then used. 
Table 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests 
Effects test Statistic Degree of freedom P-value 
Cross-section F 33.175 (13,370) 0.000 
Cross-section Chi-square 320.674 13 0.000 
Period F 1.994 (30,370) 0.002 
Period Chi-square 62.189 30 0.001 
Cross-section/Period F 12.326 (43,370) 0.000 
Cross-section/Period Chi-square 368.892 43 0.000 
Note: The panel is unbalanced because data for Poland before 1990 and that for Russia before 1989 are lacking. 
The main estimation result is given in Eq. (3). Values in parentheses below the coefficients are their t-statistics (second line) 
and associated p-values (third line). The slope coefficient is highly significant, confirming the existence of the Penn effect. The 
slope value (0.418) is close to those in similar regressions by Frankel (0.382; 2005, p.22) and Cheung et al. (0.391; 2007, p.769). 
In addition, when White cross-section or period robust standard errors are used, the slope is still significant; R
2
=0.916, which 
means the regression is a good fit. 
 log(RERi,t )= 0.278 + 0.418 log(GDPPi,t) + ui,t                                                                                                                             (3) 
           (6.075)    (15.178) 
 (0.000)    (0.000) 
R
2
=0.916,   observations=415 
  The equilibrium RER, the fitted value of RER, can be solved from Eq. (3). Subsequently, the needed appreciation or 
depreciation, which is interpreted as misalignment in this paper, can be calculated using (RER-equilibrium RER)/RER. For 
example, in 2010, the RMB RER was 58.3 (US=100) and the equilibrium RMB RER was 79.7, so the RMB RER should 
appreciate by 36.7% [the absolute value of (58.3-79.7)/58.3] to its equilibrium value. In this case, RMB RER was undervalued 
by 36.7%.
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 The misalignment of RMB RER in the whole period is depicted in Fig. 1. 
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   Fig. 1. Misalignment of RMB RER in 1980–2010. 
Note: Negative (positive) values represent undervaluation (overvaluation). 
Figure 1 shows that RMB RER misalignment evolved radically from 1980 to 2010. In 1980–1991, RMB was overvalued, and 
overvaluation declined from about 35% in the early 1980s to 1% in 1991. RMB became undervalued afterwards in 1992–2010. 
From 1992 to 2001, the RMB was undervalued by around 10%, with the smallest undervaluation (6%) in 1992 and the biggest 
undervaluation (about 16%) in 1993–1994. However, after 2002, the degree of undervaluation increased from 15% in 2002 to 
more than 30% in 2005–2010. In 2010, the RMB was already undervalued by 36.7%. 
The evolution of RMB misalignment can be explained mostly by changes in RMB RER and China’s economic growth. 
Equation (3) suggests that equilibrium RER will increase as the GDP per capita (GDPP) increases and that a RER higher (lower) 
than its fitted value will be overvalued (undervalued). In 1980–1991, RMB RER was priced higher, and it decreased from about 
70 (US=100) in the early 1980s to less than 40 in 1991. Meanwhile, China’s GDPP, measured by current US dollar and relative 
to the US, remained small with slight changes; it was around 1.5 (US=100) in the same period. These two factors led to a RMB 
RER that was higher than its fitted value (overvalued), but the degree of undervaluation decreased. In 1992–2001, RMB RER 
mostly fluctuated at around 40, but China’s GDPP doubled (from 1.5 to 2.9), leading to a RMB RER that was lower than its 
fitted value (undervalued). In 2002–2010, RMB RER increased slightly, from 40 in 2002 to 58 in 2010. However, China’s 
GDPP tripled, from 3 in 2002 to 9 in 2010, resulting in an increasing and high degree of RMB RER undervaluation. 
3. Speed of RMB appreciation 
Given that RMB RER was undervalued by 36.7% in 2010, we now focus on how it should appreciate to its equilibrium value. 
We analyze this issue from two views: speed of appreciation (discussed in this section) and path of appreciation (Section 4). 
3.1. Speed of RMB appreciation in the past and an international comparison 
To understand the speed of RMB RER appreciation in a comprehensive and objective manner, we follow Xu (2009) and 
analyze RMB appreciation in a comparative manner. We calculate and compare the annual appreciation speed of RMB and 
other similar currencies to determine if the speed of RMB appreciation is slower. 
China’s economy has been rapidly growing since its reform and opening up, so 17 countries and areas in their fast economic 
growth stages, such as Japan in 1950–1991 and Korea in 1965–1996, are chosen and listed in Table 2. Fast growth is measured 
by the (compound) annual growth rate of the country’s GDPP relative to the US (US=100 in each year), where an annual 
                                                           
4 The other misalignment is measured by (RER-equilibrium RER)/equilibrium RER, as in Frankel (2005). 
growth rate greater than zero means that the country’s GDPP grows faster than that of the US. The 17 chosen countries and 
areas in their respective periods all showed faster GDPP growth compared with the US, with most having GDPP growth rates 
greater than that of the US by more than 1.5%. China’s exchange rate was reformed greatly in 1994 and 2005, so two periods 
for RMB were chosen, one beginning in 1994 and the other beginning in 2005.   
The annual RER growth rates (RER annual appreciation speed) and GDPPs of relevant countries and areas in their fast 
economic growth stages are calculated and listed in Table 2. The countries and areas are sequenced in descending order by the 
annual RER growth rates of their currencies. The annual RER growth rate does not consider economic growth status, which 
differs across countries, so we also examine RER appreciation speed in the background of economic growth status. This can be 
done by calculating and comparing the slopes in Eq. (4), which is the reduced form of the panel data regression in Eq. (2) in its 
time-series data situation.  
log(RERt)=b0+b1log(GDPPt)+ut                                                                                                                                                       (4) 
Most of the chosen countries and areas began their fast economic growth before 1980, but the WDI includes only RERs after 
1980. Thus, we use another database, the Penn World Table (PWT) 7.0, which provides RERs [defined by Eq. (1)] and GDPPs 
(PPP converted, US=100 in each year) for 189 countries and areas for some or all of the years in 1950–2009. For China, the 
RERs and GDPPs in their same definitions in the PWT are different from those in the WDI, so both databases are used, with 
data from the PWT and WDI denoted by the subscripts PWT and WDI, respectively.5   
Before estimating Eq. (4), we first consider unit root and cointegration tests for the variables. Observations for China in 
2005–2009 and 2005–2010 are too few, so we do not perform unit root and cointegration tests for them. The ADF unit root test 
reveals that all the other variables, except those for Romania, Finland, Taiwan, and Thailand, depict I(1) behavior. Meanwhile, 
the cointegration test (Engle–Granger test for Norway and Johansen test for the others) reveals that there is at least a 
cointegration relationship in each group. For Romania, the ADF unit root test reveals that the two variables depict I(2) behavior, 
and Johansen test reveals that there exists cointegration relationship between them. For Finland, Taiwan, and Thailand, all the 
variables are stationary. Hence, for each group, Eq. (4) can be estimated. The b1 coefficients and their p-values are listed in the 
last column of Table 2.  
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Table 2 
Changes in RERs and GDPPs of relevant countries and areas in their fast economic growth stages 
Country and 
area 
Period: 
first year 
last year 
RER 
(US=100 in each year) 
GDPP 
(US=100 in each year) 
b1 for log(RER)  
in Eq. 4: 
coefficient 
(p-values) 
Value in first year 
Value in last year 
Annual 
growth rate 
Value in first year 
Value in last year 
Annual 
growth rate 
Russia 
1999 
2009 
20.7 
62.2 
11.7% 
19.5 
34.4 
5.9% 
1.83 
(0.00) 
Romania 
1999 
2009 
32.7 
64.9 
7.1% 
14.6 
25.7 
5.8% 
1.43 
(0.00) 
ChinaWDI 
2005 
2010 
42.1 
58.3 
6.7% 
9.7 
16.1 
10.7% 
0.67 
(0.00) 
ChinaPWT 
2005 
2009 
37.2 
48.9 
7.1% 
11.1 
17.8 
12.5% 
0.65 
(0.00) 
Korea 
1965 
1996 
26.8 
81.2 
3.6% 
10.6 
52.3 
5.3% 
0.55 
(0.00) 
Japan 
1950 
1991 
30.8 
128.5 
3.5% 
23.7 
96.4 
3.5% 
0.86 
(0.00) 
Nether-land 
1951 
1975 
42.3 
96.8 
3.5% 
66.7 
98.0 
1.6% 
2.18 
(0.00) 
ChinaPWT 
1994 
2009 
29.8 
48.9 
3.4% 
6.1 
17.8 
7.4% 
0.32 
(0.00) 
ChinaWDI 
1994 
2010 
35.0 
58.3 
3.2% 
5.0 
16.1 
7.6% 
0.33 
(0.00) 
Poland 
1991 
2009 
39.8 
66.8 
2.9% 
23.5 
40.3 
3.0% 
1.07 
(0.00) 
Germany 
1970 
1992 
71.1 
120.2 
2.4% 
77.4 
87.0 
0.5% 
3.60 
(0.00) 
Thailand 
1985 
1996 
39.4 
51.0 
2.4% 
11.1 
20.7 
5.8% 
0.34 
(0.00) 
Finland 
1959 
1989 
67.5 
131.9 
2.3% 
55.3 
81.4 
1.3% 
1.40 
(0.00) 
Taiwan 
1965 
1996 
43.8 
78.4 
1.9% 
13.7 
60.0 
4.9% 
0.45 
(0.00) 
Spain 
1953 
1975 
43.2 
65.2 
1.9% 
29.0 
63.9 
3.7% 
0.23 
(0.30) 
Norway 
1953 
1982 
62.9 
104.1 
1.8% 
67.9 
103.8 
1.5% 
1.99 
(0.00) 
Singapore 
1965 
1996 
55.1 
91.3 
1.6% 
25.2 
97.2 
4.5% 
0.29 
(0.00) 
Sweden 
1952 
1964 
74.9 
86.0 
1.2% 
75.8 
94.0 
1.8% 
0.56 
(0.00) 
Italy 
1952 
1982 
47.6 
67.1 
1.1% 
41.0 
78.1 
2.2% 
0.81 
(0.00) 
Hong Kong 
1960 
1993 
68.1 
91.8 
0.9% 
19.8 
86.8 
4.6% 
0.15 
(0.04) 
France 
1951 
1982 
74.5 
87.3 
0.5% 
52.2 
84.8 
1.6% 
0.59 
(0.02) 
Notes: The (compound) annual growth rate x is obtained from a·(1+x)n=b, where a and b are values in the first and last year, respectively, and n is the 
number of years examined. The associated p-values for the coefficients in Eq. (4) are calculated using Newey–West HAC standard errors. China 
refers only to mainland China. 
Source: WDI (only for data on RER and GDPP in ChinaWDI), PWT 7.0, and author’s calculation. 
First, we examine the annual growth rates (annual appreciation speed) of the listed RERs, which vary greatly from 0.5% 
(France) to 11.7% (Russia). In 2005–2010, the annual RER appreciation speed of RMB (6.7%) ranks only below that of the 
Russian ruble and Romanian new leu. Meanwhile, in 1994–2010, the annual RER appreciation speed (3.2%) of RMB ranks 
below that of five other currencies. The foregoing values, calculated using the WDI database, are roughly similar to those 
calculated for 2005–2009 and 1994–2009 using the PWT database. In addition, seen from the values, the annual RER 
appreciation speed of RMB (3.2–3.4% in 1994–2010 or 1994–2009) is very near that of the Korean won, Japanese yen, and 
Netherlands Antillian guilder (3.5–3.6%). The annual RER appreciation speed of RMB in 2005–2010 or 2005–2009 (6.7–7.1%) 
is even about twice that of the Korean won, Japanese yen, and Netherlands Antillian guilder. Therefore, in the list of 
comparable eighteen currencies, the annual appreciation speed of RMB RER is in the front row. 
Second, we examine coefficient b1 from Eq. (4), which measures RER appreciation speed when economic growth status is 
considered. The coefficients also vary greatly as in the case of annual RER growth rates, from the highest value of 3.6 
(Germany) to the lowest value of 0.15 (Hong Kong), but gives different information. Only seventeen coefficients are 
considered because b1 for Spain is not significant. In terms of RMB RER in 2005–2010 (or 2005–2009), the coefficient is 0.67 
(or 0.65), ranking tenth, above that of the Italian lira and below that of the French franc. In addition, although RMB ranks at the 
middle, the coefficient is relatively small, only about one sixth that of D-mark (the greatest), 0.67 vs. 3.6. In terms of RMB 
RER in 1994–2010 (or 1994–2009), the coefficient is 0.33 (or 0.32), ranking fifteenth, above only that of Singapore dollar and 
Hong Kong dollar. Therefore, in the list of comparable seventeen currencies with significant coefficients, the RMB ranks at the 
middle but with a relatively small value in 2005–2010. However, in 1994–2010, RMB ranks near the bottom. Under the 
background of economic growth, the speed of RMB RER appreciation indeed seems a bit slow. 
Compared with other similar seventeen currencies, the annual appreciation speed of RMB RER (without considering the 
economic growth status of countries and areas) ranks third and should not be deemed “too slow.” However, considering 
economic growth status (given China’s fast economic growth), RMB RER appreciation speed ranks at the middle (when 2005–
2010 is used) or near the bottom (when 1994–2010 is used). Thus, RMB RER appreciation is indeed a bit slow.  
3.2. Which speed of RMB appreciation is feasible in the future? 
Having known the RMB RER appreciation speed in the past, we determine at which speed the RMB should appreciate in the 
future. Instead of giving a subjective appreciation speed, we analyze which of China’s experiences is more feasible. In Section 
3.1, we have presented the RMB RER appreciation speed calculated for two periods, 1994–2010 and 2005–2010. In this section, 
we first calculate the (compound) annual growth rates of RER, NER, GDPP, and GDP in 1994–2010 and 2005–2010. Separate 
results are listed under the titles “1994–2010 scenario” and “2005–2010 scenario” in Table 3. Then we use each annual growth 
rate to forecast corresponding values from 2011 to 2022. For example, the annual RER growth rate in 1994–2010 was 3.2%, the 
actual RER value in 2010 was 58.3, the forecasted RER value in 2011 is 60.2 [58.3×(1+3.2%)], and that in 2012 is 62.1 
[58.3×(1+3.2%)
2
].   
Table 3 
Forecasting of exchange rates and GDPs in 2011–2022 for China based on 1994–2010 and 2005–2010 scenarios 
1994–2010 scenario 2005–2010 scenario 
 
 
RER 
(US=100) 
NER 
(yuan/US$) 
GDPP 
(US=100) 
GDP 
(US=100) 
 
RER 
(US=100) 
NER 
(yuan/US$) 
GDPP 
(US=100) 
GDP 
(US=100) 
 (At 3.2%) (At -1.5%) (At 10.9%) (At 10.7%)  (At 6.7%) (At -3.7%) (At 18.1%) (At 17.8%) 
2010 58.3  6.8  9.4 40.6 2010 58.3 6.8  9.4 40.6 
2011 60.2  6.7  10.4  44.9  2011 62.2  6.5  11.1  47.8  
2012 62.1  6.6  11.6  49.8  2012 66.4  6.3  13.1  56.3  
2013 64.1  6.5  12.8  55.1  2013 70.8  6.1  15.5  66.4  
2014 66.1  6.4  14.2  61.0  2014 75.6  5.8  18.3  78.2  
2015 68.2  6.3  15.8  67.5  2015 80.6  5.6  21.6  92.1  
2016 70.4  6.2  17.5  74.7  2016 86.0  5.4  25.5  108.5  
2017 72.7  6.1  19.4  82.7  2017 91.8  5.2  30.1  127.8  
2018 75.0  6.0  21.5  91.6  2018 97.9  5.0  35.6  150.6  
2019 77.4  5.9  23.9  101.4  2019 104.5  4.8  42.0  177.4  
2020 79.9  5.8  26.5  112.2  2020 111.5  4.7  49.6  208.9  
2021 82.4  5.8  29.3  124.2  2021 119.0  4.5  58.6  246.1  
2022 85.1  5.7  32.5  137.5  2022 127.0  4.3  69.2  289.9  
Notes: Values in 2010 are actual while those in 2011–2022 are forecasted. GDPP and GDP are originally measured by current US dollar and then 
converted to the indexes. 
Source: WDI and the author’s calculation. 
The annual growth rates in 1994–2010 and 2005–2010 are different, so the forecast results based on these two scenarios are 
also very different. According to the 1994–2010 scenario, the annual growth rates of RMB RER, RMB NER, China’s GDPP, 
and China’s GDP are 3.2%, -1.5% (NER appreciates by 1.5% per year), 10.9%, and 10.7%, respectively. At such annual growth 
rates, by 2022, the RER will be 85.1 (the price level of China will be 85.1% that of the US), the NER will be 5.7 yuan per US 
dollar, China’s GDPP will be about one third that of the US, and China’s GDP will be 137.5% that of the US. According to the 
2005–2010 scenario, the annual growth rates of RMB RER, RMB NER, China’s GDPP, and China’s GDP are 6.7%, -3.7%, 
18.1%, and 17.8%, respectively.
6
 By 2022, the RMB RER will be 127 (China’s price level will be 1.27 times that of the US), 
NER will be nearly 4 yuan per US dollar, China’s GDPP will be about 70% that of the US, and China’s GDP will be about three 
times (289.9%) that of the US.  
Given the different forecast results, which results are more reliable? From the view of actual economic status, the forecast 
results based on the 1994–2010 scenario are more reliable. 
(1) On RER. The 1994–2010 scenario gives an annual RER growth rate of RMB (3.2%) that is a bit smaller than that of the 
Japanese yen (3.5%) and Korean won (3.6%) and greater than that of Taiwan dollar (1.9) and Singapore dollar (1.6%). Zhang 
and Fung (2006) concluded that RMB appreciation will bring a serious negative effect on China, a reduction in output that can 
potentially lead to a liquidity trap. Xu (2008) reviewed Taiwan’s experience of currency appreciation and found that Taiwan 
dollar appreciation caused the painful short-run consequences of declining export production and employment. To overcome 
these difficulties, Taiwan introduced many changes to its economic structure. China can hardly handle a great challenge (given 
the annual RMB appreciation speed of 3.2% versus Taiwan dollar’s 1.9%) more freely compared with Taiwan, whose economy 
is more flexible and robust than China’s. In addition, the appreciation of the Japanese yen at a rate of 3.5%, especially after 
1985 (the RER appreciated at an annual rate of 8% in 1985–1991), is often viewed as a typical unsuccessful example. 
                                                           
6 Such higher annual growth rates of GDPP and GDP in the period 2005–2010, about 18%, are caused by two factors: China’s relatively faster 
economic growth compared to the US and the high degree of RMB NER appreciation, which is a more important factor. 
Considering the experiences of Taiwan and Japan, an appreciation speed of 3.2% is already enough, perhaps more than enough, 
for China to afford. Furthermore, an appreciation speed of 6.7% (from the 2005–2010 scenario), which is nearly twice that of 
the Japanese yen and more than thrice that of Taiwan dollar, seems quite unfeasible.  
(2) On GDP. The 1994–2010 scenario gives an annual GDP growth rate of 10.7%, at which China’s GDP will be slightly 
greater than that of the US after 2020 (137.5% that of the US by 2022). Meanwhile, the 2005–2010 scenario gives a startling 
rate of 17.8% per year, at which China’s GDP will be nearly three times (289.9%) that of the US by 2022. Possibly, after ten 
years, China’s GDP will surpass that of the US. However, China’s GDP being nearly thrice that of the US by then is incredible, 
given that China’s future economic growth will be slower after its thirty-year period of fast growth and that its future deep 
economic reform will be more difficult than ever. The annual GDP growth rate of 17.8% is obviously unreachable, indicating 
that the 2005–2010 scenario is unrealistic. 
Our analysis shows that an annual RMB RER growth rate of 3.2% obtained from the 1994–2010 scenario is more realistic 
than the 6.7% obtained from the 2005–2010 scenario, given that four comparable Asian currencies have an RER appreciation 
speed around 3.2% (Korean won’s 3.6% and Japanese yen’s 3.5% above this value, and Taiwan dollar’s 1.9% and Singapore 
dollar’s 1.6% below this value). Therefore, an appreciation speed of 3.2% should be mainly considered by China’s 
policymakers in future exchange rate level adjustment. Although this annual appreciation speed appears a bit slow relative to 
China’s fast economic growth (see Section 3.1), it is very feasible considering China’s lagging and slowly evolving economic 
structure.  
In Section 2.2, we have known that, in 2010, the RMB RER was 58.3, its equilibrium value was 79.7, and its misalignment 
was 36.7%. In this section, we have determined that the preferred annual appreciation speed of RMB RER is 3.2%, at which the 
RMB RER will be 79.9 (roughly equal to the equilibrium value of 79.7) by 2020. In other words, the undervaluation of RMB 
RER in 2010, if adjusted at an appreciation speed of 3.2% per year, can be corrected by 2020. 
4. Path of RMB appreciation 
Having discussed appreciation speed, we now turn to the second issue, the path of RMB RER appreciation. We follow 
Frankel (2005) and Xu (2009) in analyzing the path of RMB RER appreciation from the two components of RER: NER and 
relative price level. 
4.1. Path of RMB appreciation in the past and an international comparison 
According to Eq. (1), changes in RER can be divided into two parts: change in bilateral NER and change in relative price 
level (P/P
*
). All variables in Eqs. (5)–(7) have the same meanings as in Eq. (1). 
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The difference in log(RER) from time 0 to time t can be written as: 
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A variable’s percent change is roughly equal to its natural logarithm difference, (xt-x0)/x0≈logxt-logx0, so the percent change 
in RER, (RERt-RER0)/RER0, can be measured by the difference of its natural logarithms, log(RERt)-log(RER0). The same 
concept can be applied to P, P
*
 and NER. The difference in log(RER) from time 0 to time t can be decomposed into two 
components, [log(Pt /P0) - (log(Pt
*
/P0
*
)] and -[log(NERt) - log(NER0)], whose contributions can be measured by two ratios, 
[log(Pt/P0)-(log(Pt
*
/P0
*
)]/[log(RERt)-log(RER0)] and -[log(NERt)-log(NER0)]/[log(RERt)-log(RER0)], respectively. From the two 
ratios, we can determine how changes in relative price level (P/P
*
) and NER contribute to changes in RER. The decomposed 
RER changes for eighteen countries and areas are calculated and given in Table 4. The countries and areas are sequenced by 
each NER’s contribution to its RER. Considering the table and given the definitions of RER and NER in Eq. (1), a positive 
value of -[log(NERt)-log(NER0)]/[log(RERt)-log(RER0)] means that NER has a positive effect on its RER (when NER 
appreciates, its RER also appreciates). In addition, the sum of -[log(NERt)-log(NER0)]/[log(RERt)-log(RER0)] and [log(Pt/P0)-
(log(Pt
*
/P0
*
)]/[log(RERt)-log(RER0)] is 100%, as seen from Eq. (7). 
Table 4 
Decomposition of RERs for eighteen countries and areas 
Country  
and 
area 
Period: 
first year 
last year 
RER0  
RERt 
log(RERt)-
log(RER0) 
NER0 
NERt 
log(NERt)-
log(NER0) 
-[log(NERt)-
log(NER0)] 
/[log(RERt)-
log(RER0)] 
[log(Pt/P0)- 
( log(Pt
*/P0
*)] 
/[log(RERt)-
log(RER0)] 
Germany 
1970 
1992 
71.1 
120.2 
0.525 
1.87 
 0.80 
-0.852 162.2% -62.2% 
Singapore 
1965 
1996 
55.1 
91.3 
0.505 
3.06 
1.41 
-0.775 153.5% -53.5% 
Japan 
1950 
1991 
30.8 
128.5 
1.429 
361 
135 
-0.986 69.0% 31.0% 
Taiwan 
1965 
1996 
43.8 
78.4 
0.584 
40.0 
27.5 
-0.376 64.5% 35.5% 
ChinaWDI 
2005 
2010 
42.1 
58.3 
0.326 
8.19 
6.77 
-0.190 58.5% 41.5% 
ChinaPWT 
2005 
2009 
37.2 
48.9 
0.275 
8.19 
6.83 
-0.182 66.1% 33.9% 
Netherland 
1951 
1975 
42.3 
96.8 
0.828 
1.72 
1.15 
-0.407 49.2% 50.8% 
ChinaWDI 
1994 
2010 
35.0 
58.3 
0.510 
8.62 
6.77 
-0.242 47.3% 52.7% 
ChinaPWT 
1994 
2009 
29.8 
48.9 
0.496 
8.62 
6.83 
-0.233 46.9% 53.1% 
Thailand 
1985 
1996 
39.4 
51.0 
0.259 
27.2 
25.3 
-0.069 26.7% 73.3% 
Norway 
1953 
1982 
62.9 
104.1 
0.504 
7.14 
6.45 
-0.101 20.1% 79.9% 
Sweden 
1952 
1964 
74.9 
86.0 
0.138 
5.17 
5.17 
0.000 -0.1% 100.1% 
Russia 
1999 
2009 
20.7 
62.2 
1.103 
24.6 
28.8 
0.156 -14.2% 114.2% 
Finland 
1959 
1989 
67.5 
131.9 
0.670 
0.54 
0.72 
0.293 -43.8% 143.8% 
Spain 
1953 
1975 
43.2 
65.2 
0.412 
0.24 
0.35 
0.370 -90.0% 190.0% 
Romania 
1999 
2009 
32.7 
64.9 
0.683 
1.53 
2.94 
0.651 -95.3% 195.3% 
Korea 
1965 
1996 
26.8 
81.2 
1.107 
266 
805 
1.105 -99.9% 199.9% 
Hongkong 
1960 
1993 
68.1 
91.8 
0.299 
5.71 
7.74 
0.303 -101.4% 201.4% 
Poland 
1991 
2009 
39.8 
66.8 
0.517 
1.06 
2.85 
0.991 -191.7% 291.7% 
Italy 
1952 
1982 
47.6 
67.1 
0.343 
0.32 
0.70 
0.774 -225.9% 325.9% 
France 
1951 
1982 
74.5 
87.3 
0.158 
0.53 
1.00 
0.630 -398.5% 498.5% 
Notes: RER is defined by Eq. (1), with US=100 in each year. NER is expressed in national currency units per US dollar. 
Source: WDI (only for data on ChinaWDI), PWT 7.0, and author’s calculation. 
Table 4 presents various RER appreciation paths for the listed countries and areas. There are three kinds of paths as discussed 
below. 
(1) The first kind includes the cases of Germany and Singapore. Each RER appreciation was realized totally from NER, with 
relative price level giving a negative effect. In their periods, each country’s NER appreciated as relative price level decreased. 
The NER appreciated too much that it not only offset all the negative effect of the relative price level but also led to RER 
appreciation.  
(2) The second kind includes the cases of Japan, Taiwan, China, Netherlands, Thailand, and Norway. Each RER appreciation 
was realized partly from NER and partly from relative price level. However, contributions from changes in RER and relative 
price level differ. For Japan and Taiwan, each RER appreciation was realized mostly (about two-thirds) from NER appreciation 
and a little (about a third) from an increase in relative price level. For Netherlands, RER appreciation was partly (half) realized 
from NER appreciation and partly (half) from an increase in relative price level. For Thailand and Norway, however, each RER 
appreciation was realized a little (about a quarter) from NER appreciation and mostly (about three-quarters) from an increase in 
relative price level. 
For China, in the period 2005–2010 or 2005–2009, NER appreciation accounted for about 60% of RER appreciation and the 
increase in relative price level accounted for about 40% (similar to the cases of Japan and Taiwan). In the period 1994–2010 or 
1994–2009, about 50% of RER appreciation was accounted for by NER appreciation and the other half by the increase in 
relative price level (similar to the case of Netherlands).  
(3) The cases of all the other countries belong to the third kind. Each RER appreciation was totally realized from the increase 
in relative price level because NER depreciated during the period. However, the cases are different. For Sweden, Russia, and 
Finland, the negative effect of NER was weak, less than 50%. For Spain, Romania, Korea, and Hong Kong, the negative effect 
of NER was about 100%. Furthermore, for Poland, Italy, and France, the negative effect of NER was strikingly about 200% or 
even more.  
China is free to choose a path from these various appreciation paths. However, as seen from experience (both periods in the 
study), China has chosen the path of realizing RER appreciation partly from NER appreciation and partly from an increase in 
relative price level. In addition, the contribution of RMB NER to RMB RER appreciation had increased in the latest years, from 
smaller than 50% in 1994–2010 to about 60% in 2005–2010, an obvious result of US pressure.  
4.2. Which path of RMB appreciation is desirable in the future? 
Having known that China has chosen an appreciation path through both NER appreciation and an increase in relative price 
level, we wonder whether the path is expected by the US and China. We analyze this issue from the effect of the appreciation 
path on the US and China. Although the effects of RMB RER appreciation are comprehensive, with effects on export, import, 
employment, investment, and consumption, the most direct and pressing effect (especially from the view of government) is on 
export. Hence, we illustrate the effect of RMB appreciation on export. 
 Following Frenkel and Ros (2006) and Thorbecke and Zhang (2009), we use RER and the foreign country’s income to 
explain the effect of RER effect on bilateral export. To increase the sample size and reflect the current situation, we use monthly 
data. Monthly data on the relative price level (P/P
*
) of RER and GDP of China cannot be obtained, so we use consumer price 
index with fixed base and industrial production as proxies, respectively. NER is expressed in RMB yuan units per US dollar. All 
data are from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and DOTS online databases. Although other data can be traced back 
to the early 1980s, the monthly consumer price indexes and industrial production data of China are only available after 1987 
and after 1994, respectively. Thus, the actual samples used in the regressions, Eq. (7) and (8), have to be reduced accordingly. 
The ADF unit root test reveals that all the variables depict I(1) behavior in each group. Furthermore, Johansen test proves that 
there is at least one cointegration relationship between the variables in each group. Ordinary least squares give the regression 
results in Eqs. (7) and (8). Equation (7) describes how China’s export (EXPCH) is affected by US industrial production (INDUS) 
and the RMB RER, in terms of its three components, NER, China’s consumer price index (CPICH), and US consumer price 
index (CPIUS). Similarly, Eq. (8) describes how US export (EXPUS) is affected by China’s industrial production (INDCH) and 
the RMB RER. The values in parentheses below the coefficients are their t-statistics (second line) and associated p-values (third 
line), which are calculated using Newey–West HAC standard errors and covariance. 
log(EXPCH) = -26.01 + 1.05 log(INDUS) + 0.35 log(NER) -0.36 log(CPICH) + 6.92 log(CPIUS)                                        (7) 
(-61.69)   (4.60)                     (2.32)                 (-1.89)                     (22.74)                                                                                          
(0.00)    (0.00)                     (0.02)                  (0.06)                       (0.00)    
Adjusted R
2
=0.97, sample=January 1987 to October 2011, observations=298 
log(EXPUS) = -5.96 + 0.37 log(INDCH) - 0.99 log(NER) -1.23 log(CPICH) + 4.56 log(CPIUS)                                           (8) 
(-1.68)   (2.28)                    (-2.40)               (-4.16)                     (5.65)                                                                                         
(0.09)    (0.02)                     (0.02)                (0.00)                      (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
=0.95, sample=January 1994 to September 2011, observations=213 
Eqs. (7) and (8) show that RMB NER appreciation will lead to a decrease in China’s export (1% NER appreciation will lead 
to a 0.35% decrease in China’s export, given other variables unchanged, following the same) but to an increase in US export 
(1% NER appreciation will lead to a 0.99% increase in US export), which is consistent with economic theory. An increase in 
China’s price level will lead to a decrease in China’s export (1% increase in CPICH will lead to a 0.36% decrease in China’s 
export) and to a decrease in US export (1% increase in CPICH will lead to a 1.23% decrease in US export). There are two 
explanations. First, when China’s price level increases, the production cost of China’s export enterprises will also increase. This 
will subsequently reduce the output of these enterprises, including their export. Second, when China’s price level increases, the 
dispensable income of local citizens will decrease, leading them to reduce their consumption, including their consumption of 
import goods from the US. 
In terms of policy implication, for China’s export [Eq. (7)], given that the coefficient of log(NER) is 0.35 and that of 
log(CPICH) is -0.36 (significant at 10% level), NER appreciation and an increase in price level have roughly an equal negative 
effect on export. Therefore, the effects of any choice of RMB RER appreciation path, whether totally from NER appreciation, 
partly from NER appreciation and partly from an increase in relative price level, or totally from an increase in relative price 
level, on China’s export are the same. However, if NER appreciation coincides with an increase in relative price level, RER will 
appreciate at a compound rate, resulting in a greater negative effect on the economy. This is the case in the period from 
November 2006 to July 2008, when RMB NER appreciated by 13.1%, China’s CPI increased by 16.2%, and US CPI increased 
by 9.2%, all of which gave an RER appreciation of 20.1% (13.1%+16.2%-9.2%). This high degree of RER appreciation, 
through both NER and relative price level channels, was one of the main factors that forced many of China’s offshore export 
enterprises to close shops at that time. Had China controlled the increase in its price level at a smaller rate at that time, the 
negative effect of RER appreciation would have been greatly reduced. For example, had China’s CPI been kept the same as that 
of the US, RER appreciation would have been reduced by 7% (16.2%-9.2%). In this light, Germany’s case is a good example. 
Germany experienced a high degree of NER appreciation (from 1.87 D-mark per US dollar in 1970 to 0.8 D-mark per US dollar 
in 1992) but controlled its price level well (the relative price level had a negative effect on its RER appreciation). Thus, in RMB 
RER appreciation, China’s policymakers should focus on controlling the price level instead of always resisting US pressure on 
RMB appreciation.
7
 As long as China’s policymakers control the price level well, the negative effects of RMB RER 
appreciation will not be as catastrophic as imagined. 
For US export [Eq. (8)], given that the coefficient of log(NER) is -0.99 and that of log(CPICH) is -1.23, RMB NER 
appreciation (increase in China’s price level) has a positive (negative) effect on US export. These two different effects suggest 
that realizing RMB RER appreciation totally from NER is preferred by the US. In other words, if RMB RER appreciation is 
realized partly or totally from an increase in relative price level, US export will be harmed. 
Considering benefits to both China and the US, our analysis shows that the desirable path of RMB RER appreciation is 
totally from NER. Meanwhile, the increase in price level should be slow. The appreciation of NER and slow increase in price 
level (at a smaller rate, even smaller than that of the US) will not only help US export but also reduce the negative effect of 
NER appreciation on China. The above analysis combined with findings in Section 3 suggest that the recommended annual 
RMB RER appreciation speed of 3.2% should be realized totally from NER, as in the cases of Germany and Singapore (see 
Table 4), rather than partly from NER and partly from the relative price level as China earlier experienced.  
5. Conclusion 
This study has examined three issues on RMB RER (relative to the US dollar): how it was undervalued, which speed of 
appreciation is feasible, and which path of appreciation is desirable. The examination of these issues adds new understanding to 
the current debate on RMB appreciation. 
Although there are many models used in assessing currency valuation, the Penn effect model, which is broadly used, is most 
appropriate for this study. Using the panel data Penn effect model, we find that in 1980-1991 the RMB was all overvalued and 
showed a decline trend. But it turned to be undervalued in 1992-2010. In latest years, the degree of undervaluation increased 
from 15% in 2002 to greater than 30% in 2005–2010. In 2010, the RMB was undervalued by 36.7%. The change in RMB 
misalignment during this period can be explained mainly by changes in RMB RER and China’s economic growth. 
To understand the speed of RMB RER appreciation comprehensively, we calculate the annual appreciation speed of RMB 
and 17 other currencies of countries and areas in an economic development stage similar to that of China. The annual 
appreciation speed of RMB RER was 6.7% in 2005–2010 and 3.2% in 1994–2010, which is in the front row compared with that 
of the other seventeen currencies. However, considering China’s fast economic growth, the coefficient of the Penn effect model 
shows that RMB appreciation is a bit slow. A forecast of future RER and GDP based on the 1994–2010 and 2005–2010 
scenarios shows that the annual appreciation speed in 1994–2010 is more reliable than that in 2005–2010. Comparison shows 
that four other Asian currencies also had an RER appreciation speed of around 3.2% during their similar periods, thereby 
supporting the recommendation that China should make this rate an important reference in future RMB RER appreciation. At 
this rate, the RMB’s undervaluation in 2010 can be corrected by 2020. 
Lastly, we calculate the contributions of changes in NER and relative price level to changes in RER for all eighteen chosen 
currencies. Globally, there are three kinds of RER appreciation paths: totally through NER, totally through relative price level, 
and partly through NER and partly through relative price level. For RMB, past RER appreciation was realized partly from NER 
appreciation and partly from an increase in relative price level, with the contribution of NER increasing in the latest years. 
Econometric analysis shows that RMB NER appreciation will have a negative effect on China’s export and a positive effect on 
the US’s export, whereas an increase in relative price level will have a negative effect on the export of both China and the US. 
Given the different effects in the two components of RMB RER, the desirable path of its future appreciation is totally from 
appreciating NER while making the increase in price level slow. This appreciation path is in the interest of both China and the 
US. In addition, China’s policymakers should improve their ability to manage the price level. If China’s price level is 
effectively controlled, the effects of RMB appreciation will not be as disastrous as imagined. 
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